





Holding Canada’s Cities 
to Account:





Despite their importance in Canadians’ lives and their cost, most Canadian
cities have rudimentary financial controls and routinely miss their budget
targets. Better budgeting and reporting could raise their performance and
make cities more accountable to taxpayers.
NO. 145, NOVEMBER 2011
FISCAL & TAX COMPETITIVENESSCities are the most visible level of government for most Canadians, providing services such
as waste collection, policing and transit. Yet their budgets are the most opaque of any level
of government. 
Municipalities generally use accounting in their budgets that does not match what they use
in their financial reports. Peering through the messy numbers reveals that most cities
routinely miss budget targets by large amounts. Councillors and taxpayers who seek to
hold these municipal governments to account face a daunting task.
Amid the mixed record, however, are some municipalities with clearer numbers and better
records for spending control. That fact, along with improvements that have occurred at the
federal and provincial levels in recent years, shows that progress is possible.
To improve financial performance and budget clarity, cities should adopt some of the
budget reforms that higher-order governments have implemented over the past decade.
This would require that cities take steps, either of their own accord or by provincial
mandate, to:
• Adopt accrual accounting in budgets; 
￿ Integrate operating and capital budgets;
￿ Present multi-year budgets;
￿ Report department-by-department results on the same basis as in budgets; and
￿ Show gross, rather than net revenues and expenditures.
These five basic reforms would create clearer, more consistent budgets and would bring the
financial management of Canada’s municipalities into line with their fiscal impact and
their importance in Canadians’ lives.
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THE STUDY IN BRIEF
Note to readers: This is a revised version of a Backgrounder issued on November 23, 2011. We thank those who provided comments before and after the
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C
ities are frontline providers of
many services Canadians
receive from their governments,
including key quality-of-life functions
such as drinking water, policing,
public transit, and garbage collection. 
These services come at considerable cost: total
local government expenditures in Canada in 2008
came to some $75 billion, or more than $2,200
per Canadian.
1 So Canadians have good reason to
hold their municipal governments accountable.
Yet municipal budgets, and the success or failure
of municipal governments in meeting their
financial goals, are among the least understood
areas of Canadian fiscal policy. 
In this Backgrounder, we attempt to shed some
light on this area by examining the sharply
contrasting financial control practices of selected
municipalities and, to the extent the problematic
published numbers permit, by evaluating how well
they fulfill their budget commitments. In general,
our review tells a story of inconsistent and
problematic budgeting and financial reporting,
and outcomes very different from what readers of
budgets might reasonably expect.
The picture is not uniformly bleak, however.
Surrey, British Columbia, and Markham and
London in Ontario, for example, currently present
budgets and financial results so that elected
representatives and taxpayers can easily understand
the full costs of municipal spending promises, while
the Durham, Waterloo, and Niagara regions in
Ontario most consistently spend close to what
they budget. Many other municipalities, though,
routinely miss budget targets by large amounts
and use incompatible accounting for budgeting and
reporting. Councillors and taxpayers who seek to
hold these municipal governments to account thus
face a daunting task.
Poor budget presentations and missed budget
targets are also not uncommon among other levels
of government in Canada. In the past, the federal
and provincial governments also used inconsistent
accounting for the budgets they voted on at the
beginning of each fiscal year and the results they
published after its end. Pressure for better
accountability is ending these practices, however,
and most senior governments have moved to
accrual accounting consistent with the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants’ Public Sector
Accounting Handbook. These improvements, and
the better managed among Canada’s cities, show
how municipal governments can raise their game.
Municipal Budgets and Financial
Reports: Some Background
Coming at the subject for the first time, one
might reasonably expect Canada’s cities to show
better financial management and fiscal accountability
than its senior governments. One might think, for
example, that the control provincial governments
exercise over municipalities – cities are, to use a
common constitutional term, “creatures of the
provinces” – would produce common, transparent
budgets and public accounts. On the spending
side, direct operating costs tend to be a higher
share of local government budgets than of
provincial and federal budgets, so the needs of
transfer recipients and the formulas that often
drive transfer payments should produce fewer
We thank Colin Busby for comments, and the many cities, organizations, and individuals, including the Single Tier and Regional Treasurers
group, that reviewed previous drafts of this Backgrounder. We stress, however, that not all reviewers agreed with our observations, and we take
full responsibility for the analysis and conclusions presented here. Robin McNamara provided excellent assistance double-checking and
inputting municipal budget data.
1 Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, table 385-0003; available online at http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/govt52a-eng.htm. This
figure excludes $48 billion in education expenses that Statistics Canada reports as a local government expenditure.C.D. Howe Institute
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unbudgeted surprises.
2 On the revenue side, local
governments generally set property taxes – mill
rates – at whatever share of the taxable value of
property will raise the money needed to match
planned spending, reducing the likelihood, so
problematic for senior governments, of finding
that bumps and dips in cyclical tax bases throw
things off course. 
As we document in the next two sections,
however, this seemingly reasonable expectation
would be badly off the mark. Because comparing
budget targets to outcomes requires first figuring
out what revenue and spending figures to compare,
we begin by evaluating the financial presentation
of municipal budgets and financial results,
highlighting some of the features that make them
hard for elected representatives and voters to follow.
With that as background, we then make some
adjustments to compare budget targets to outcomes
in a consistent way across the country – an exercise
that shows how far Canada’s cities have to go to get
their results in line with their announced intentions.
Reading Municipal Budgets and 
Financial Reports 
As with the C.D. Howe Institute’s surveys of the
fiscal accountability of Canada’s federal, provincial,
and territorial governments, the two linked
premises behind this survey of municipal
governments are straightforward.
3 One is that,
without poring over dozens of pages, tables of
numbers, and footnotes, or doing lots of arithmetic,
a person of reasonable intelligence – a motivated
but time-constrained councillor, say – should be
able to pick the key revenue and spending totals
out of a budget or end-of-year financial report.
The other premise is that, with no inordinate
effort or expertise, this person should be able to
compare the same totals between the two
documents. Ideally, then, the figures this person
would use – and the ones we would like to have
used in this review – would be displayed early and
prominently in each year’s budget documents and
in each year’s financial report. Yet, in almost every
major Canadian municipality, such a reasonably
intelligent and motivated person would find these
simple tasks hard and, in most cases, impossible.
Four major problems stand in the way.
Different accounting practices for budgets 
and financial reports: Since 2009, Canada’s
municipalities have produced financial reports at
year-end using accrual accounting. Like private
sector organizations, and like the federal, provincial,
and territorial governments – which moved to
accrual accounting several years earlier – these
financial reports record income as it is earned, not
necessarily when cash is received, and obligations
as they are incurred, not necessarily when the cash
is disbursed. Accrual accounting attempts to
match revenues and expenditures to relevant
activities. Capital projects, for example, are not
expensed at once but, rather, give rise to annual
depreciation charges as they deliver their services.
Entitlements to pension and other post-retirement
benefits, to pick another key example, are
recorded as they accrue, even though they might
not require cash payments until years later.
In contrast, the budgets municipalities produce
at the beginning of the year use cash accounting,
rather than accrual accounting. These documents
show cash the municipality expects to receive or
disburse during the year, regardless of when the
activities those receipts and disbursements relate
to are expected to occur. This is not a sensible
2 Looking at Ontario, for example, where detailed municipal expenditure data are available on a consistent basis, cities spent only 12 percent
of their 2008 total operating and capital expenditures on transfers. For the province, by comparison, transfers to boards, authorities and
persons represented 76 percent of expenditures in fiscal year 2008/09. Ontario municipalities spent $37.9 billion (out of $42.3 billion in
total expenses) on the programs and services they directly control, whereas the province spent $23.2 billion on direct costs, such as salaries
and wages, interest expenses, and other expenses, out of $96.8 billion in total expenses.
3 See Adrian, Guillemette, and Robson (2007); and Busby and Robson (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) for evaluations of the fiscal reporting and
performance of Canada’s senior governments. Busby, Dachis, and Robson (2010) apply the same approach in looking at the City of Toronto.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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basis for budgeting: senior governments long
moved away from it; businesses do not do it; and
even households, which are often more cash-flow-
constrained than governments and businesses,
typically do not count the full cost of buying a car
or a house in the same budget as the grocery
money. The point in this context is that this
fundamental discrepancy means that straightforward
measurement of gaps between voted and actual
revenues and expenses is impossible.
4
Separate operating and capital budgets: A related
problem is that most municipalities prepare two
separate budgets:
5 a “capital” budget for projects
that might take more than a year to complete and
will yield services for a long time into the future,
and an “operating” budget for items to be consumed
and expensed during the year (see Box 1). Some
cities present and vote on these two types of
budgets together; others do so separately. As just
noted, capital projects create long-lived assets.
Accrual accounting attempts to match the cost of
capital projects as well as possible to the benefits
they will produce. Voting capital projects on a
cash basis thus makes little sense, and can
exacerbate policymakers’ tendency to neglect the
interactions between capital and operating
commitments – especially when the two budgets
are not presented and voted on at the same time
and when, as is often the case, the municipality
does not provide multi-year projections in
operating budgets. For our reasonably intelligent,
non-expert reader, separate operating and capital
budgets exacerbate the problem created by cash
accounting, since producing totals for revenues
and spending in those municipal budgets requires
finding and adding two sets of figures – which,
when funds are moving between operating and
capital budgets, might include double counting.
Different levels of aggregation in budgets and
financial reports: Less fundamental, but still
problematic, is that most municipalities report
department-level spending at different levels of
aggregation in budgets than in financial reports.
For example, while most municipalities separate
expenses and revenues for specific departments in
their budgets – for example, policing and
firefighting – financial reports might aggregate
into broader categories – for example, “protection
services.” These inconsistencies sometimes result
from provincial mandates. For example, in Ontario,
cities are required to report their audited year-end
expenses in their Financial Information Return
with standardized aggregations of municipal
operations, and use the same basis of departmental
aggregation in their financial statements. Happily,
some municipalities provide their own reconciliations
in their budgets in a user-friendly form. In the
majority of cases, however, inconsistent aggregation
compounds the problems that elected
representatives, voters, and even municipal
managers themselves have in figuring out how
closely end-of-year results match budget votes,
since it complicates what should be a
straightforward search for the operations most
responsible for under- or overshoots.
Reporting net rather than gross amounts: Like
businesses, governments face choices about when
to report gross values for revenue and spending
associated with specific entities or programs and
when to show the difference between the two on a
net basis.
6 Netting simplifies presentations and is
suitable in some situations, but these advantages
come at considerable potential cost in
4 Many cities do produce quarterly “variance” reports that show the difference between actual spending and budgeted spending, but these
reports are not audited or included in annual financial statements.
5 Senior levels of government might have a separate infrastructure spending plan, but the main budget projections are produced on a
consolidated basis.
6 Balance-sheet presentations involve similar choices. Our focus is on flows, rather than stocks, so we do not explore the potential problems of
balance-sheet netting here. We note, however, that the recent financial crisis uncovered some important examples of financial institution
balance sheets that showed net items that, if they had been shown as gross assets and liabilities, would have revealed far greater exposure and
risk than many regulators, managers, and shareholders appreciated.C.D. Howe Institute
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Box 1: Operating and Capital Budgets
* In 2009, the first year that municipalities were required to report the audited value of capital assets, Ontario municipalities collectively held
a net book value of $109 billion of tangible capital assets (Ontario 2011). The province held a net book value of $63 billion in tangible
capital assets at the end of fiscal year 2009/10 (Ontario 2010).
Canadian cities have two budgets, a capital budget for key infrastructure projects and a separate operating budget
for day-to-day costs. Operating budgets must be balanced without relying on borrowed funds, but capital budgets
treat debt issuance as funding sources to meet expenses. 
The difference between cash accounting, as is still standard in most municipal budgets, and accrual accounting –
now the standard for financial reports – is especially pertinent to capital budgets. Capital budgets with cash
accounting treat a capital expense – even on an infrastructure project that will yield benefits for decades into the
future – as an up-front expense, whereas an accrual-based financial account amortizes the cost over the capital
project’s expected lifetime. Because capital assets* loom larger in municipal activities than in federal and
provincial activities, differences in accounting methods between budgets and financial reports matter more for
municipalities than they do for senior governments.
economically meaningful reporting. For
municipalities, a distinction between “tax-
supported” and “rate-supported” services might
seem reasonable – for example, reporting net
amounts for the latter, with user fees and
dedicated revenues deducted from gross expenses,
to highlight the tax-supported elements of the
budget that presumably are of most interest to
taxpayers. Residents still pay expenses on rate-
supported programs, such as water and sewer
services, however, and having different presentations
for fee-supported services creates a misleading
measure of a city’s fiscal footprint. Many senior
governments have consolidated more public sector
entities in their budgets and financial statements
in recent years, so that their total revenues and
expenditures give a fuller picture of all the entities
the government controls. Additionally, in some
cities, departmental-level expenditures are
presented only as netted against departmental
revenues, and the only presentation of total
municipality-wide gross expenses is on types of
spending, such as salaries or contracts. Such
reporting makes individual departments with
revenue-raising abilities, such as levying user fees,
less accountable for spending control – and
further complicates the task of figuring out why
results differ from intentions.
Grading Canadian Municipal Budgets 
With these shortcomings in mind, we created
several benchmarks of good budgeting practice
based in part on the reforms that the federal 
and provincial governments have made over the
past decade.
The Criteria
To undertake our analysis, we examined whether
the municipalities met the following criteria in
their most recent budgets and financial reports at
the time of writing:
￿ Consistent accrual accounting in budgets and
financial reports. Does the municipality present its
budgets and financial reports on a consistent basis,
using full accrual accounting for both?
￿ Combined operating and capital budget. Does the
municipality report combined capital and
operating expenses to present the total amount of
annual municipal spending? 
￿ Multi-year budgets. Does the municipality present
more than one year of projected municipal-wide
operating expenditures and revenues? 
￿ Consistent aggregation. Does the municipality use
the same department-level aggregation in budgetsEssential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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and annual reports or provide a separate summary
with consistent aggregation?
￿ Combined rate- and tax-supported expenditures.
Does the municipality report the full revenues and
expenditures of all municipal entities by including
rate-supported programs and utilities in total
expenditures?
￿ Gross revenues and expenses. Does the municipal
budget report gross expenditure figures for
municipal departments and entities?
We graded municipal budget documents based on
how well they met these criteria of clearly presented
budgets. A municipality got an “A” if it met at
least four of our six criteria of a good budget and
an “F” if it met none of them (see Table 1). A
municipality received partial points if it partially
met one criterion, such as reporting both capital
and operating amounts together in a summary of
total municipal expenses but not taking the
additional step of summing the two figures to
create a single annual expense amount for the year
or not reporting important data in table format.
The Results 
Surrey, British Columbia, and Markham and
London, Ontario, were the only municipalities
that met, at least partially, as many as five of our
six criteria. Markham and Surrey were unique in
having taken measures to report budgets on the
same accounting basis as their year-end financial
statements, while London partly met a number of
criteria of good budgeting practice. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Hamilton
met none of these criteria of good budgets, and is
the only municipality to receive a failing grade.
Hamilton’s operating budget supported by
property taxes does not present gross expenditures
on a department-by-department basis in the main
budget document, meaning that answering a
straightforward question such as which activities
had the largest annual increase in expenditures
requires a detective exercise. Further, Hamilton
does not report municipal utility expenditures at
all in any of its main budget documents.
Brampton, Halifax, Sudbury, and Windsor met
only one criterion of good budget presentation,
and each received a “D.”
Measuring Fiscal Accountability 
Clear and transparent budget and accounting
processes are means to the end of good fiscal
management. The superior practices that have
evolved in these areas among Canada’s senior
governments allow legislators and taxpayers,
without inordinate effort, to assess how closely
actual results match budget plans. Having described
why this task is much harder with respect to
municipal governments, we now present the
results of our attempt to do so.
Assembling the Numbers 
We compiled spending data from annual budgets
and end-of-year financial statements from 2001,
7
or the first year of a municipality’s existence,
8
through 2010 for all municipalities with a population
of more than 250,000 or a combined operating
budget of more than $500 million in that year.
9
In cases where municipalities were amalgamated –
7 Since Ontario municipalities must also complete provincial reports with similar information, we used the standardized provincial end-of-year
reports for cities in that province and annual financial reports produced by the municipalities in other provinces. As a reviewer from the
Town of Markham pointed out, however, a change in the accounting for a municipal electricity utility in 2001 requires us to make use of
Markham’s financial statements, which provide a restatement of income that accounts for this change and which is more appropriate for 
this exercise.
8 Some years of data were unavailable for some cities. As of September 7, 2011, Sudbury, Mississauga, Calgary, and Halton Region were
unable to provide the authors with capital expenditures for 2000; these amounts are not shown in their 2001 budgets, making a year-over-
year comparison from 2000 to 2001 impossible. In addition, Halton Region’s gross operating expenditure data for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable.
9 The only exceptions are Laval and Quebec City, for which we were unable to collect municipal budget data for the full time-frame we
desired, partly due to recent amalgamations.C.D. Howe Institute
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Table 1: Scorecard for Most Recent Approved Budgets, Major Canadian Municipalities
Note: Scale runs from 4 or more points (A), at least 3 points (B), 2 points (C), 1 point (D), and 0 points (F). Cities partly meeting criteria


































Brampton  2011 No No No No Yes No
Calgary  2011 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Durham Region 2011 No No Yes No Yes Yes
Edmonton  2011 No No No No No Yes
Halifax  2010/11 No No No No No – Halifax Water Yes
is separate body
Halton Region 2011 No No No All but gross Yes Yes
expenses
Hamilton  2010 No No No No No No
London 2011 No Close – only for Yes All but gross Yes Yes
net expenditures expenses
Markham 2011 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mississauga  2011 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Montreal  2011 Yes Yes – for No No Yes Yes
expenses only
Niagara Region 2010 No No No No Yes Yes
Ottawa  2011 No No Yes, but No Yes Yes
not totalled
Peel Region 2011 No No No No Yes Yes
Sudbury 2011 No No No No Yes Gross not
by department
Surrey  2011 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Toronto  2010 No No No No Yes Yes
Vancouver  2011 No No No No Yes Yes
Vaughan 2010 No No Yes No Yes Yes
Waterloo Region 2010 No No Partly, only No Partly, only Yes
in pie chart in pie chart
Windsor 2010 No No No No No Yes
Winnipeg  2011 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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or, in Montreal’s case, de-amalgamated – over this
period, we used the budget amounts from the year
after the change.
10
Because municipal budgets and financial
statements use different accounting rules, and
because the rules have sometimes changed during
the year, comparisons of levels of spending
between budgets and financial results are often
uninformative or misleading. To reduce the effect
of these distortions, we used growth rates from the
prior year as calculated from the figures presented
in budget and financial report documents,
respectively. Growth rates for announced and
actual expenditures, and the difference between
the two, are reported in Appendix Table A-1.
Where changes in accounting methods affected
results reported for prior years – as happened to
financial statements, but not budgets, with the
move from full accrual accounting by all
municipalities after a change in Public Sector
Accounting Board rules in 2009 – we calculated
growth rates from the restated amounts, not the
original amounts for budgets and for financial
reports (see Box 2).
11
Comparing the growth rates calculated from
these budget numbers with the growth rates
calculated from the numbers reported at year-end
allows us to produce two summary measures of a
municipality’s success, or lack of it, in hitting its
budget targets:
￿ Bias: the average difference between actual and
predicted results. This is the arithmetic mean of
the annual differences (in percent), and captures
the direction – over or under – of actual versus
budgeted results, weighing each percentage
deviation over the period equally.
￿ Accuracy: the mean square error of the deviations.
If over- and undershoots cancel out, a series of
large misses will have the same bias score as a series
of small misses. The accuracy measure weighs
larger misses more heavily and sums them without
regard to sign, creating a useful summary indicator
of deviations from targets, regardless of their direction.
The Results: How Well or Poorly
Municipalities Hit Their Targets 
Durham, Waterloo, and Niagara regions and
Halifax and Toronto stand out as the top five
municipalities when it comes to the accuracy of
spending results versus budgets (see Table 2).
Brampton has the lowest budget accuracy score,
with actual spending missing planned spending by
an average of 51 percent. Peel Region has a very
good score for bias, meaning it did not consistently
under- or overspend compared with its budget
plans, but it consistently missed targeted
expenditures by a wide margin. Vaughan has the
largest bias of all municipal budgets and the
second-worst accuracy. 
Similar efforts to match budget projections and
end-of-year results for the federal, provincial, and
territorial governments (Busby and Robson 2011)
allow us to comment – not very positively – about
how Canada’s cities compare with them. If the
top-performing municipality on the expenditure
accuracy measure, Durham Region, were a province,
it would rank eighth among what would then be a
field of 15 senior governments, while Brampton’s
inaccuracy in hitting its expenditure targets is six
times worse than the most inaccurate of the senior
governments, Yukon. Notwithstanding the
advantages municipalities might appear to have in
achieving their budget targets, they are generally
far worse at it than the federal, provincial, and
territorial governments.
10 Since December 31, 2000, in addition to Montreal’s de-amalgamation, Ottawa, Hamilton, and Sudbury have amalgamated. We excluded the
first year of a new municipality since there was no directly comparable previous year’s budgeted or actual expenditure from which to calculate
an annual growth rate – thus, we excluded the 2001 budget for Hamilton, Ottawa, and Sudbury, and the 2002 budget for Montreal. We did,
however, include Montreal’s 2001 pre-amalgamation budget. For the post-2006 de-amalgamated Montreal, we used the combined revenues
and expenses of Montreal City Council and the Urban Agglomeration Council.
11 For discussions of this methodology and the measures of adherence to budget targets presented below, see Adrian, Guillemette, and Robson
(2007); and Busby and Robson (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). C.D. Howe Institute
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The Cumulative Effects of Missed 
Budget Targets 
In municipalities where spending overshoots are
common, they sometimes cumulate to startling
amounts. As a share of the 2010 budget’s
expenditures, cumulative overspending from 2001
to 2010 in Vaughan, Edmonton, and London
amounted to 20 percent, or higher, of their most
recent total budgets (Table 3).
12 While spending
overshoots are the usual story in some
municipalities, as they are among Canada’s senior
governments, many municipalities have tended to
spend less than they budgeted. Winnipeg, Surrey,
and Halton Region, for example, spent $598
million, $147 million, and $215 million,
respectively, less than they voted between 2001
and 2010. While some undershoots might reflect
successful quests for in-year savings, they might
also reflect capital expenditures not being
completed as planned.
To understand why some cities failed to meet
their budget targets, we separated our analysis of
over- and undershoots from 2001 to 2008 to
produce separate tallies for capital operating
budgets (Figures 1 and 2).
13 Operating budgets are
usually larger – and easier to estimate – than
Box 2: Methodology 
12 We reiterate that our approach is to compare each year’s results to the same year’s budget, which has the effect of restarting the meter every
year, with the previous year’s over- or undershoots becoming part of the new year’s baseline.
13 We analyzed capital and operating budgets separately between 2001 and 2008 because municipalities reported audited year-end capital and
operating expenditures separately in their financial statements in these years. The move to full accrual accounting ended this separation from
2009 forward. The only exception is Winnipeg, which reported only consolidated total expenditures in its financial statements in all years.
In keeping with our premises regarding the reasonably intelligent and motivated reader, we used the most
conspicuously stated total gross expenditure figures for each of a municipality’s capital, operating, and utility
budgets in each year. Where budgets clearly report total expenses separately for “tax-supported” services (such as
police, fire, or other general municipal services) and “rate-supported” services (such as water), we combined the
two amounts. We also combined capital and operating budgets when the two are reported separately.
As described in the text, we then divided the dollar changes in expenditures anticipated in a budget by the 
prior-year level of gross expenditure in the same document, and divided the dollar changes in expenditures
reported at year-end by the prior-year level of gross expenditure in the budget. Most cities also do not report 
the previous year’s budgeted capital expenses; in those cases, we used the originally budgeted amounts for 
the comparison.
As noted in the text, cities transfer funds between capital and operating budgets. In our tallies, we simply added
the two. This resulted in some double counting in budgets. But these transfers between budgets are a relatively
small share of total budgets.
The standardized provincial financial reports of actual spending that we used for Ontario cities do not restate
amounts from the previous year. Ontario municipalities produce these statements in addition to their audited
financial statements. Lacking restated totals from the previous year, for most cities we used the previously stated
amounts as the baseline in year-over-year comparisons, and we assumed that the amounts as initially reported
were not restated enough to affect our results. Because all cities moved to accrual accounting in 2009, we used
audited financial reports for 2009 and 2010 for all cities; the 2009 financial statements also provided restated
2008 amounts, allowing a year-over-year comparison.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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Table 2: Summary of Spending Bias and Accuracy, Budgets of Major Canadian Municipalities, 2001-’10
Note: Gross operating expenditure data for Halton Region for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable. Calgary and Mississauga did not provide
capital expenses for 2000 that were comparable with those of 2001; the analysis for these cities and for Hamilton starts in 2002. For Sudbury
and Ottawa the analysis starts in 2003. Montreal data for 2002 are excluded because of amalgamation.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, from municipal budgets and financial reports, and, for Ontario municipalities, the Financial Information Return.
Change in Expenditure Forecast
Municipality Bias Rank Accuracy Rank
(%) (%)
Brampton 1.5 12 51.4 23
Calgary 0.1 2 6.2 7
Durham Region 0.7 8 3.9 1
Edmonton 4.1 20 9.9 13
Halifax 0.5 6 5.1 4
Halton Region 3.9 19 14.2 20
Hamilton 1.0 9 11.3 15
London 4.5 21 7.4 10
Markham 2.0 14 10.8 14
Mississauga 2.8 18 11.4 17
Montreal 0.5 5 5.8 6
Niagara Region 0.6 7 4.7 3
Ottawa 1.7 13 12.2 19
Peel Region 0.0 1 14.4 21
Sudbury 1.4 10 6.4 8
Surrey 2.6 17 7.8 11
Toronto 0.4 4 5.1 5
Vancouver 0.2 3 9.5 12
Vaughan 4.5 22 21.6 22
Waterloo Region 2.5 16 4.3 2
Windsor 1.5 11 12.0 18
Winnipeg 4.6 23 7.3 9
York Region 2.2 15 11.3 16
capital budgets. Most municipalities had
cumulative operating budget overshoots between
2001 and 2008, with Vaughan having the largest
overshoot relative to its 2010 operating budget.
This preponderance of overshoots in operating
budgets suggests that cities should apply more
scrutiny to in-year cost control in annual
departmental expenditures. 
Vaughan, Edmonton, and London were the
worst offenders in cumulatively overspending on
capital expenditures over the 2001-08 period. In
contrast, however, most cities spent less than
budgeted on the capital side. Several factors, alone
or together, might explain this undershooting. 
For example, higher-order government grants
might not have materialized as planned during the
course of a year, cities might have used contingency
allowances for capital projects – intentionally
overestimating the costs in budget plans
14 – or
they might have failed to complete capital projects
14 Our calculations of the bias for capital budgets between 2001 and 2008 revealed that the average bias was 7.2, almost four times higher than
that for operating budgets.C.D. Howe Institute
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because of delays. Markham, Sudbury, and
Brampton were the most notable underspenders
relative to their 2010 capital budgets over the period.
Recommendations for Better
Municipal Budgets
Municipalities should use the grades of budget
clarity we have assigned to look for and imitate
better budgeting practices. In many instances,
these would involve simply following some of the
same budget reforms that higher-order governments
have implemented over the past decade.
Adopt accrual accounting in budgets:
Municipalities should transition to fully
consolidated accrual accounting in their budgets,
as is now standard provincially and federally and
Table 3: Summary of Cumulative Expenditure Overshoots/Undershoots of Budgets of Major Canadian
Municipalities, 2001–2010 
Note: Gross operating expenditure data for Halton Region for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable. Calgary and Mississauga did not provide
capital expenses for 2000 that were comparable with those of 2001; the analysis for these cities and for Hamilton starts in 2002 and in 2003
for Sudbury and Ottawa. Montreal data for 2002 are excluded because of amalgamation.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, from municipal budgets and financial reports, and, for Ontario municipalities, the Financial 
Information Return. 
Municipality Total Expenditure Total Expenditure
Overshoot (+)/Undershoot (-) Overshoot/Undershoot as a
Percentage of 2010 Budget 
($ millions) (%)
Winnipeg -598 -34.2
Surrey  -147 -25.6
Halton Region -215 -19.6
Waterloo Region -230 -19.5
Mississauga  -132 -18.0
Windsor -136 -14.1





Ottawa  -237 -7.7
Toronto  -730 -6.1
Calgary -9 -0.2
Vancouver 15 1.4
Durham Region 19 1.6
Montreal 107 2.0
Halifax 21 2.5
Niagara Region 45 4.6
Peel Region 144 6.8
Edmonton 701 19.7
London 383 36.9
Vaughan 119 46.4Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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as is already the practice in their financial
reports.
15 The almost universal practice of
presenting municipal budgets on a cash basis,
rather than on the same accrual basis that is now
required for their financial reports, suggests some
reluctance on the part of councils and municipal
staff to adopt accrual accounting. While not
making light of transition issues – although the
move to accrual accounting for financial reports
means municipalities must face those issues in any
event – we feel strongly that accrual accounting
makes more sense. 
As we noted earlier, accrual accounting
generally tries to match the recording of revenues
and expenditures to the activities to which they
pertain. This makes as much sense in budgets as it
does in financial reports. With regard to capital
assets, a municipality would have a better
15 For a summary of how municipalities should transition from cash-based to accrual-based budgeting, see Ratford (2008). City budget officials
will face transition problems in moving to accrual accounting in their budgets – as did the federal and provincial governments when they
made the change. Budget officials could present both the cash-based budget and the full accrual-based budget to highlight the differences
between the documents in the first year. After that, however, they should present a single, full accrual budget. Municipalities also could help
explain the new accrual-based budget to the public by showing the analogy between investments in tangible capital assets that depreciate,
such as buses, and an individual’s need to make monthly payments for a vehicle.
Cumulative 2001-2008 Operating Budget Overrun as Share of 2010 Total Budgeted 
Operating Expenditures (percent) Overruns (+) and Underruns (-) 























Figure 1: Cumulative Deviation from Budgeted Operating Expenditures, Major Canadian Municipalities
Note: Gross operating expenditure data for Halton Region for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable. The analysis for Halton starts in 2003. The
analysis for Ottawa, Sudbury, and Hamilton starts in 2002. Montreal data for 2002 are excluded because of amalgamation. Winnipeg is
excluded because it did not separately report capital and operating expenses in its financial statements.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, from municipal budgets and financial reports, and, for Ontario municipalities, the Financial Information Return.opportunity to calibrate the revenues it raises to
match depreciation charges each year, so that they
match the services provided by the asset. Under
cash-based systems, capital investments show up
as money is spent, rather than being amortized
over the period in which the investment will yield
benefits.
16 Under accrual accounting, the people
who benefit from an asset pay the cost. Accrual
accounting also creates opportunities to show
obligations as they will be incurred, rather than
when cash payments become necessary. This is a
major advantage for councillors and taxpayers
who otherwise might neglect such important
future obligations as pension entitlements of city
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Cumulative 2001-2008 Capital Budget Overrun as Share of 2010 Total Budgeted 
Capital Expenditures (percent) Overruns (+) and Underruns (-) 























Figure 2: Cumulative Deviation from Budgeted Capital Expenditures, Major Canadian Municipalities
Note: Calgary and Mississauga did not provide capital expenses for 2000 that were comparable with those in 2001. The analysis for those
cities and Hamilton starts in 2002. Capital expenditure data for Halton Region for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable and Ottawa and Sudbury
did not provide 2001 capital expenditures. The analysis in those cities starts in 2003. Montreal data for 2002 are excluded because of
amalgamation. Winnipeg is excluded because it did not separately report capital and operating expenses in its financial statements.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, from municipal budgets and financial reports, and, for Ontario municipalities, the Financial Information Return.
16 As Ratford (2009) argues, the current cash-based accounting system effectively amortizes an asset during its development and construction
(the period of cash disbursements).
17 That such opportunities exist does not mean they will always be used wisely. As in the private sector, accounting standards in the public
sector change as opinions about the best ways to represent economic reality change. Current public sector accounting standards are open to
criticism, for example, for valuing pension obligations using arbitrary, rather than market-based, discount rates, which typically makes those
obligations look smaller than the cost to pay them off at the valuation date (Laurin and Robson 2010). For municipalities to move to the
standards currently applied to the federal government and most provinces and territories would nevertheless be a big step forward from the
current system, which is far cruder than the system private sector entities or senior governments use.As a practical matter, accrual accounting is now
the standard for the financial reports of all
Canadian governments, cities included. While the
specific methods used can and will improve,
moving back to cash accounting would be a
retrograde step that is, happily, impossible to imagine.
For municipalities, therefore, the immediate task
is to present budgets on the same basis, so that a
fundamental obstacle to understanding on the
part of the reasonably intelligent and motivated
councillor and citizen disappears.
One obstacle to the transition in some provinces
is inconsistencies between the framing of balanced
budget rules applying to municipalities and the
superior financial management that accrual
accounting allows. Typically, municipalities are
required to present balanced operating budgets,
while capital budgets may be in surplus or deficit.
But accrual accounting would eliminate the
distinction between capital budgets and operating
budgets. For provinces not prepared to let their
municipalities budget as they see fit and to suffer any
consequences of bad choices, one option would be
to focus on the overall bottom line – much as the
federal and provincial governments typically target
their budget balances as calculated on an accrual
basis. An alternative would be to focus on debt-
service costs relative to revenues. The key point is
that provincial legislation should not mandate
budget targets that are inconsistent with goals
represented more meaningfully by financial
reports using accrual accounting.
Integrate operating and capital budgets: A related
reform would be to eliminate separate operating
and capital budgets. Indeed, a move to full accrual
accounting in budgets would do this automatically.
One means to induce municipalities to enact these
reforms would be to amend provincial legislation
on municipalities and individual city charters to
require municipalities to follow provincial
guidelines on producing annual operating and
capital budgets that match the accounting systems
of their annual reports.
18 Since the current
inconsistent presentation of budget plans makes
comparing municipal overall spending plans and
future liabilities unnecessarily difficult, provincial
regulation would make such comparisons easier.
In provinces that continued to mandate reporting
using methods and categories that differ from
those that municipalities find most useful in
planning their expenses, municipalities should
provide reconciliation reports that compare
consistently calculated numbers.
Present multi-year budgets: Consolidated budgets
would also make multi-year budgeting more
feasible.
19 Today’s capital spending has key
implications for tomorrow’s capital and operating
spending. Looking only one year ahead exacerbates
many problems, such as the neglect of interactions
between capital commitments – spending on, say,
transit infrastructure – and related future operating
commitments. Cities should approve budgets – or
deviations from long-term plans – on an annual
basis, but multi-year budgeting can guard against
one-time fixes that ignore long-term consequences.
A consolidated, multi-year budget would recognize
the effect of long-term capital spending plans –
forecasts of which are already part of all municipal
capital budgets – on long-term revenue requirements.
Since municipalities are on a fixed election cycle,
with elections every three or four years, depending
on the province, multi-year budgets sensibly
should be based on the same cycle, which would
Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
Backgrounder 145 | 13
18 Such requirements, however, should not mandate or allow municipalities to deviate from good accounting practices for either purpose. For
example, the Ontario Municipal Act, 2001 was amended in 2009 to allow municipalities to exclude from their annual budgets amortization
expenses of post-employment benefits expenses and solid waste landfill closure and post-closure expenses. The Minister of Municipal Affairs
and Housing is slated to review this additional regulation by the end of 2012, and our recommendation is that the provincial government
require municipalities to include these expenses in their budgets. Currently, Ontario requires only that staff present to council a report of the
extent of these costs. Alberta allows, but does not require, municipalities to produce their budgets on a comparable basis as their financial
statements.
19 In British Columbia, for example, all municipalities except Vancouver are subject to Community Charter, SBC 2003, c 26, Part 6 – Financial
Management, which requires multi-year financial plans.let councillors define the long-term plan for a
municipality at the outset of their tenure.
Report department-by-department results on the
same basis as in budgets: Consistent aggregation
allows observers to identify activities in which
results differ significantly and consistently from
what was budgeted. Rather than have provinces
define the units of departmental aggregation in
budgets and annual reports – which might not
suit all municipal departmental structures – the
best approach would be to allow cities the
flexibility to define their own suitable organizational
breakdown, though provinces could require that
cities maintain that aggregation between budgets
and annual reports or provide a comprehensive
table of reconciliations. This requirement should
be implemented so as not to reduce the amount of
information available in budget decisions – for
example, by maintaining the existing level of
departmental detail in current municipal budgets.
Show gross, rather than net, amounts: Municipal
gross expenditure and revenue budgets should also
include wholly owned corporations such as utilities,
so that their activities appear in a transparent,
public, and accountable budget process that
protects councillors and taxpayers from surprises.
With budgets produced on a consolidated basis,
there would be only a single budget for all fully
controlled municipal departments.
The question then becomes which entities
should be included in the consolidated budget.
The general standard applied in senior levels of
government is to report, on a consolidated basis,
entities that are under the complete control of
government and operate in a non-commercial
environment. However, many government-owned
enterprises that are not under direct government
control or that operate commercially often appear
in government books only when they return a
profit or require a subsidy.
20 Applied to municipal
budgets, this would consolidate water and waste
utilities, while recognizing only net revenues from
many government business enterprises.
Improving Municipal Fiscal
Accountability 
Finally, councillors and taxpayers alike should
insist that their municipal governments adhere
more closely to the budget their council votes
every year. Where the budget and the financial
report use different accounting methods,
explanations that blame discrepancies on the
differences are unacceptable: the accounting
should be consistent. And when the results are
available on a consistent and standardized basis,
councillors and taxpayers should insist that
deviations from budgeted amounts revealed in
year-end results become smaller and presentations
that reconcile them become more transparent.
The chronic overspending of cities such as
Edmonton, London, and Vaughan means that
taxpayers there are paying more than they would 
if these cities had stuck to their budget plans.
More fundamentally, both underspending and
overspending undermine the accountability of
municipalities to their voters. Clearer, more
consistent figures and better adherence to budget
targets would bring the financial management of
Canada’s municipalities into line with their fiscal
impact and their importance in Canadians’ lives.
C.D. Howe Institute
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20 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation is an example in the former category; the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is an example in
the latter.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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Table A-1: Annual Expenditure Increase, Major Canadian Municipalities, 2001–2010 
Note: Gross operating expenditure data for Halton Region for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable. Calgary and Mississauga did not provide capital
expenses for 2000 that were comparable with those of 2001; the analysis for these cities and for Ottawa, Sudbury, and Hamilton start in 2002.
Montreal data for 2002 are excluded because of amalgamation. Ottawa and Sudbury capital expenses for 2001 are missing.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, from municipal budgets and financial reports, and, for Ontario municipalities, the Financial Information Return.
Brampton Calgary Durham Edmonton Halifax Halton Hamilton London Markham Mississauga Montreal Niagara
Region Region Region
Announced Spending Change (%)
2001 21.2 n/a 5.0 6.8 12.6 n/a n/a 3.9 0.0 n/a -1.6 3.2 
2002 20.4 -5.6 5.3 -6.9 3.7 n/a 2.1 -7 .1 20.9 3.2 n/a 8.3
2003 36.2 10.1 7 .5 2.4 -2.6 1.9 4.3 -0.6 -2.1 7 .4 4.4 1.9
2004 7 .1 5.3 10.3 9.8 14.6 7 .0 4.2 2.6 20.8 3.7 5.3 7 .6
2005 -8.0 2.3 18.7 3.3 16.1 21.3 11.3 14.5 4.7 7 .5 4.6 11.7
2006 35.4 14.2 5.6 -2.0 3.2 4.1 1.4 2.5 -0.1 15.8 0.9 1.9
2007 -8.5 19.4 1.9 16.9 6.7 1.2 10.9 0.0 11.9 3.1 4.8 1.4
2008 22.0 6.2 4.4 7 .0 2.7 24.2 -2.9 3.4 18.0 15.5 9.5 6.2
2009 10.0 10.9 9.0 19.2 -4.7 24.8 29.3 -0.4 -1.3 -6.4 5.5 7 .9
2010 -4.9 -0.6 4.2 0.2 4.9 -7 .9 -1.7 -5.9 -11.0 18.5 -3.0 -2.3
Actual Spending Change (%)
2001 133.3 n/a 12.4 16.2 10.7 n/a n/a 7 .8 21.5 n/a -0.5 9.5
2002 -79.1 2.8 5.0 -6.7 7 .5 n/a 20.5 11.0 12.2 -13.0 n/a 6.8
2003 8.5 5.6 9.2 9.7 8.8 4.8 -2.7 2.3 8.0 16.0 4.4 5.3
2004 13.1 2.1 17 .1 7 .5 14.2 6.2 5.4 5.4 4.3 -2.3 5.8 7 .2
2005 23.5 7 .6 15.4 9.3 12.4 2.2 16.2 11.2 15.5 11.4 5.5 6.6
2006 0.0 12.3 7 .6 9.0 0.8 16.4 0.8 0.7 -6.7 -3.0 -7 .0 7 .1
2007 7 .6 8.5 2.0 22.7 5.4 7 .8 2.5 8.3 10.9 8.0 19.7 -0.5
2008 0.4 13.0 1.8 24.8 -2.8 3.3 3.6 6.4 -1.1 26.2 11.6 0.3
2009 2.9 6.0 4.3 1.7 2.8 2.2 4.5 1.6 4.6 -2.3 -1.4 5.4
2010 5.4 3.8 4.2 3.9 2.3 2.5 -1.0 3.5 -0.3 2.1 -3.4 5.8
Difference (%)
2001 112.1 n/a 7 .4 9.4 -1.9 n/a n/a 3.9 21.5 n/a 1.1 6.3
2002 -99.5 8.4 -0.3 0.2 3.8 n/a 18.4 18.1 -8.7 -16.2 n/a -1.5
2003 -27 .8 -4.5 1.7 7 .3 11.3 2.9 -7 .0 3.0 10.2 8.6 0.0 3.5
2004 6.0 -3.2 6.8 -2.2 -0.4 -0.7 1.2 2.8 -16.5 -5.9 0.5 -0.5
2005 31.5 5.3 -3.3 6.0 -3.7 -19.1 4.9 -3.3 10.8 3.9 0.8 -5.1
2006 -35.5 -2.0 2.0 11.0 -2.4 12.3 -0.6 -1.8 -6.7 -18.9 -8.0 5.2
2007 16.1 -10.9 0.1 5.8 -1.4 6.6 -8.3 8.4 -1.0 4.9 14.8 -1.9
2008 -21.6 6.8 -2.7 17 .9 -5.5 -20.9 6.5 3.0 -19.1 10.7 2.1 -5.9
2009 -7 .2 -4.9 -4.8 -17 .6 7 .4 -22.5 -24.8 2.0 5.9 4.1 -6.9 -2.5
2010 10.4 4.4 0.0 3.7 -2.7 10.4 0.8 9.4 10.8 -16.4 -0.4 8.0
AppendixC.D. Howe Institute
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Table A-1: Continued
Note: Gross operating expenditure data for Halton Region for 2000 and 2001 are unavailable. Calgary and Mississauga did not provide capital
expenses for 2000 that were comparable with those of 2001; the analysis for these cities and for Hamilton starts in 2002. Montreal data for 2002
are excluded because of amalgamation. Ottawa and Sudbury capital expenses for 2001 are missing.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, from municipal budgets and financial reports, and, for Ontario municipalities, the Financial Information Return.
Ottawa Peel Sudbury Surrey Toronto Vancouver Vaughan Waterloo Windsor Winnipeg York
Region Region Region
Announced Spending Change (%)
2001 n/a -1.0 n/a 5.8 3.9 4.0 5.8 5.9 -2.7 12.2 17 .6
2002 n/a 27 .7 n/a 3.5 0.8 9.8 6.0 6.0 4.6 5.3 19.8
2003 0.6 26.4 4.0 5.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 7 .1 12.3 -1.1 23.8
2004 -6.7 -0.2 7 .5 4.4 2.0 5.6 19.1 4.5 8.4 2.5 11.8
2005 22.6 -13.4 6.9 21.5 8.0 9.5 33.0 7 .4 7 .9 8.8 -10.0
2006 26.8 15.5 9.0 -2.6 7 .8 2.3 -25.2 15.3 16.5 3.1 3.9
2007 -13.7 5.8 16.8 9.3 11.9 12.0 13.2 6.9 2.2 15.3 9.1
2008 9.1 16.0 7 .2 12.1 4.6 -3.4 -4.3 5.3 2.5 2.9 10.9
2009 -2.2 19.1 4.5 2.1 7 .6 5.9 9.8 17 .8 13.1 10.4 22.0
2010 8.6 -12.2 -1.5 28.1 11.7 29.2 -1.2 5.7 4.8 0.8 1.7
Actual Spending Change (%)
2001 n/a 15.4 n/a 4.5 -1.1 2.8 -6.0 6.2 17 .9 -3.0 15.4
2002 n/a 13.0 n/a -0.3 5.3 7 .0 37 .6 6.6 -11.1 1.7 9.7
2003 7 .1 7 .6 13.9 8.8 11.2 5.0 -4.8 6.4 9.7 1.3 11.7
2004 -1.0 10.8 0.4 12.6 5.4 6.2 38.1 5.2 16.9 1.5 21.2
2005 9.3 8.9 5.3 13.5 8.2 11.6 -3.2 3.8 13.2 2.3 10.9
2006 2.2 6.0 9.2 0.1 7 .7 5.2 2.8 9.6 -4.7 1.6 2.4
2007 3.5 0.7 3.9 8.2 4.8 7 .9 -3.5 3.5 6.3 3.5 3.7
2008 6.8 10.5 6.2 10.9 5.1 18.1 20.5 7 .0 6.6 2.8 11.3
2009 -0.6 5.8 3.1 -2.1 4.3 4.6 10.7 8.2 0.4 0.6 0.2
2010 3.9 4.6 1.2 7 .4 4.8 9.7 10.8 0.2 -0.1 2.0 1.6
Difference (%)
2001 n/a 16.4 n/a -1.3 -5.0 -1.2 -11.8 0.3 20.6 -15.2 -2.2
2002 n/a -14.6 n/a -3.8 4.4 -2.8 31.6 0.6 -15.7 -3.7 -10.1
2003 6.6 -18.8 9.9 3.2 10.0 3.7 -6.2 -0.7 -2.6 2.4 -12.1
2004 5.6 11.0 -7 .0 8.2 3.3 0.7 19.0 0.7 8.4 -1.0 9.4
2005 -13.3 22.3 -1.6 -8.0 0.2 2.1 -36.3 -3.6 5.2 -6.4 20.9
2006 -24.6 -9.5 0.2 2.7 0.0 2.9 28.0 -5.7 -21.3 -1.4 -1.5
2007 17 .3 -5.1 -12.9 -1.1 -7 .1 -4.1 -16.7 -3.4 4.1 -11.8 -5.5
2008 -2.3 -5.4 -1.0 -1.2 0.5 21.4 24.8 1.7 4.2 -0.1 0.4
2009 1.6 -13.3 -1.5 -4.2 -3.3 -1.3 0.9 -9.6 -12.7 -9.7 -21.8
2010 -4.7 16.8 2.7 -20.6 -6.9 -19.5 12.0 -5.6 -4.9 1.1 -0.1
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